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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The brief of Appellees attempts to discredit plaintiffs' Statement of 
Material Facts by stating the same is conclusory, nonobjective, unsupported and 
misleading. The record reflects the defendants' overstatement. Defendants' fail to 
cite a single incident that supports their claim that plaintiffs mislead the Courts. 
The record is replete with references to defendants' multiple admissions of civil 
and criminal violations of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. 
The record herein establishes that the material facts are clear, the law is 
clear and the trial courts' application of the law to the facts of this case warranted 
the imposition of liability upon the defendants as a matter of law. The trial courts' 
refusal to follow the law or apply the law to the facts of this case warrants 
reversal. 
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the record is full of references to 
defendants' abuses of their motor vehicle dealer's license and privileges. In 
addition to the initial citations in appellants' brief each fact previously set forth is 
supported by the following additional references in the record: 
1. Fact Number 1. (R. 184 - 188, 378.) 
2. Conover knowledge that he committed civil and crime violations of 
the Motor Vehicle Act when he and Clark bought, advertised, displayed and sold 
the subject vehicle from Clark's home. (R. 186, 277 - 281, 378, 385, 397, 419.) 
3. Clarks' conduct as an unlicensed, unbonded, motor vehicle salesman 
in purchasing, advertising, displaying and selling the subject vehicle for Conover 
from Clark's home. (R. 186, 277 - 281, 379, 391.) 
4. Old Republic Surety Co, dealer bond issued for the benefit of K & K 
Sales covers losses suffered by reason of the principal's violation of any laws or 
rules respecting commerce in motor vehicles. (R. 3, 61, 233, 378.) 
5. The defendants common enterprise acted as (a) a "Supplier" under 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and (b) a "Merchant" under the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. (R. 218, 252 - 53, 276 - 82.) 
6. Defendants' admit to multiple civil and criminal violations of the 
Motor vehicle Act when they induced plaintiffs' purchase by Clark's placement of 
advertisements, displays and sale of the subject vehicle from Clark's home. (R. 
252-53,276-82,373,375.) 
7. Conover at all material times owned the subject vehicle, allowed all 
repairs to be performed in Conover/K & K's name and assisted in defrauding the 
State of Utah of Sales Tax revenue. (R. 201, 276 - 82, 372 - 80.) 
8. Defendants did not properly, safely, completely, or professionally 
repair the subject vehicle and sold the same with the incomplete, improper, 
unprofessional and unsafe repairs that were concealed by the vehicle's exterior 
skin and body parts. (R. 244 - 45, 248 - 49. 276 - 82, 366, 373 - 88,402, 403.) 
9. Clark failed to inform plaintiffs of the facts concerning the unsafe, 
inadequate and incomplete repairs, which the defendants' knew existed. 
Defendants controlled, contracted and paid for the repairs that were made. In 
addition, Clark offered his personal guarantee that he (Clark) had properly 
repaired the subject vehicle and that the same was safe and fit for use as a 
passenger car and for plaintiffs' particular purposes. (R. 215 - 31, 245, 248, 252, 
256 - 59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.) 
10. Defendants knew the subject vehicle's crush zones, collapse zones 
and structural integrity were not repaired or restored because they attempted no 
such repairs to the subject vehicle. The costs the defendants incurred in 
connection with their repairs evidence the defendants' knowledge of the nature 
and extent of their inadequate repairs. The defendants' hiding their incomplete 
repairs under the subject vehicle's outer skin to hide their failures to re-
manufacture, re-construct and restore the subject vehicle to industry and 
manufacturer's standards and specifications. (R. 215 - 31, 245, 248, 252, 256 -
59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.) 
11. Clark personally financed, advertised, displayed and sold the subject 
vehicle from Clark's home. Clark's advertising, display and sell of the subject 
vehicle violated civil and criminal provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. (R. 
215 - 31, 245, 248, 252, 256 - 59, 276 - 82, 373 - 88, 391 - 97, 417 - 19.) 
12. Following plaintiffs' decision to purchase the subject vehicle 
Conover prepared all of the purchase documents. The purchase documents reflect 
that K & K Sales owned the subject vehicle and that it was part of K & K Sales' 
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dealer inventory. The sale documents wholly failed to reflect Clark's ownership 
interest therein (R. 186,195 - 213, 370, 373 - 388.) 
13. Plaintiffs were subsequently involved in a minor accident. When 
repairs resulting from the accident were attempted, the magnitude of the 
incomplete, inadequate, unprofessional and unsafe repairs made by or at the 
direction of the defendants became obvious when the subject vehicle's outer skin 
was removed. (R. 215 - 19, 243 - 54, 370 - 71, 380, 402 - 03.) 
14. The subject vehicle was then disassembled for repairs and inspection 
by the repair shop it had been taken to, by plaintiffs' insurance adjuster, by an 
investigator from the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission and others. Each person who inspected the subject vehicle concluded 
that the repairs made by or at the direction of the defendants were defective and 
unsafe and that the cost of restoring the subject vehicle to safe operation exceeded 
its fair market value. (R. 215 - 19, 243 - 45, 401 - 02.) 
15. Defendants' refused to take corrective action concerning their 
breaches of civil and criminal provisions of their contractual duties owed by each 
of them to plaintiffs and their breaches of the laws respecting commerce in motor 
vehicles. As a result plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in order to obtain the remedies 
provided by law. (R. 1 17,18 - 20, 95 - 112.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS' ADMISSIONS OF MULTIPLE CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS RESPECTING 
COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES HAS GIVEN RISE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' PRIVATE, INDEPENDENT CAUSES OF ACTION 
Appellants brief suggests that an appropriate theoretical approach to 
deciding this case is to determine whether the statutes' upon which plaintiff claims 
are based create independent or dependent causes of action. (Brief of Appellants 
at 11 -12.) This Court's determination that consumers may pursue independent 
causes of action against licensed and bonded dealers for multiple civil and 
criminal violations of statutes would clearly define the public policy that governs 
and controls the following acts: 
1. The Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act"). 
2. The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("Sales Practices Act"), and 
3. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("Commercial Code"). 
The trial court determined that plaintiffs' claims and causes of action, based upon 
the defendants admitted civil and criminal violations of these statutes, were 
dependent and by themselves insufficient to afford any relief for their violation. 
Plaintiffs believe that the statutes create independent causes of action based on the 
following statutory language. 
The Sales Practices Act, § 13-11-19(1), (2), (3) & (4) unconditionally 
recognize that a consumer may bring an independent action regardless of whether 
or not an adequate remedy at law exists. (R. 201, 254, 281, 282, 402 - 403.) The 
defendants concede the "Sales Practices Act provides for the potential private 
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enforcement of any violation of the Act." (See Brief Of Appellees at page 16.) 
The Motor Vehicle Act § 41-3-205(2) & (3) provides for a cause of action against 
licensed and bonded dealers together with an award of attorney's fees in cases 
successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal. § 41-3-210(1) (b, 
c, d, i, 1, m, n), and (6) identify specific acts that are prohibited and which the 
defendants admit violating. (R. 277 - 281.) 
§ 41-3-401, enacted in 1991, is conspicuously missing from defendants' 
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. (R. 196.) § 41-3-401(5) & (6) provide a cause of 
action to enforce the rights and remedies provided for under this section in 
addition to sanctions under §41-3-701. § 41-3-404 states that a person may 
maintain an action against a dealer on the dealer's corporate surety bond. (R. 277 
- 280.) §§ 41-3-701 and 41-3-702 set forth the criminal and civil penalties 
associated with the defendants' actions complained of herein. § 41-3-702 (l)(b)(i, 
ii & iv), (c)(iv &vii) (4) and (5) state the civil penalty and the availability of a civil 
action by a purchaser for violations set forth under subsection (1). (R. 233 - 236, 
277-280.) 
The Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 70A-1-203, 70A-1-205, 70A-2-102 
through 70A-2-106 defines the scope, breadth and application of the same to the 
facts of this case. (R. 223 - 230.) Defendants' concede that the Commercial Code 
applies to plaintiffs' claims. (See Brief of Appellees at page 24.) The Honorable 
Pat Brian properly applied Utah's statutory law to the undisputed material facts in 
determining that plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of express and 
implied warranties and liability for inadequate repairs were factual determinations 
for the jury to make. (R. 274, 374 - 381.) The Honorable Glen Iwasaki lacked 
authority to overrule Judge Brian. (R. 374, 375, 380, 381.) Where the defendants 
presented no new arguments or additional facts and did not correct their 
contradictory and inconsistent statements, a sufficient showing of pretext was 
established to have the jury decide which versions of defendants' facts, if any, 
were to be believed. (R. 380, 381.) 
This Court's ruling that one may pursue and maintain a private independent 
cause of action should clarify the manner in which the laws applicable to 
consumers are to be applied to consumer transactions. This Court's ruling should 
plainly state the State's public policy as set forth in the statutes and as articulated 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Woodhaven Apt v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 
1997). Finally this Court should remind the district courts that Utah's public 
policy, as expressed by Utah statutes, are to be followed and applied in consumer 
litigation. 
Alternatively, if it were determined that the statutes in question create 
dependent causes of action, then it becomes necessary to identify what the statutes 
are dependent upon in order to obtain relief thereunder. A ruling that the statutes 
create dependent causes of action would effectively repeal them by judicial fiat. 
Such a ruling would sanction the defendants' assertion that one may simply avoid 
liability for shoddy, incomplete, unsafe and incompetent work by closing one's 
eye's to the truth and claiming ignorance. (R. 382.) Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 
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450, 453 (101 Cir. 1990). Such a ruling would create greater incentives for 
dealers, merchants and suppliers to hide and conceal material facts concerning the 
products they sell thereby further polluting the stream of commerce and rendering 
less merchantable their products' fitness for ordinary use and for one's particular 
purposes. (R. 385.)(§§'s 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314 and 70A-2-315). This would 
result in greater incidence of fraudulent and unfair sales practices. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS IGNORED STATE LAW WHEN 
THEY IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
Defendants' claim that plaintiffs' did not cite specific statutory provisions 
or particular conduct in opposition memoranda filed with the Court is without 
merit. (R. 172 - 179). The record speaks for itself. (R. 214 - 254, 275 - 282, 373 
- 388, 417 - 419, as does the Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings, 
dated April 16, 1998 pages 20 through 29.) Defendants' focus on plaintiffs' 
complaint overlooks the obvious facts that were developed by means of 
defendants' discovery responses and depositions in addition to the facts that were 
known at the inception of the lawsuit. Defendants' assertion that plaintiffs offered 
no facts or allegations that defendants had violated any statutes cited by plaintiffs 
is likewise incorrect. (R. 214 - 254, 276 - 282, 373 - 397, 417 - 419.) 
The record also contradicts defendants' claims that plaintiffs' brief for "the 
first time in this litigation" alleged conduct, which if proven constituted violations 
of the generally cited acts. (R. 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203, 
208, 215 - 231, 233, 237, 245, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388, 
391 - 397, 417 - 419.) The facts as presented and argued before the trial court 
established that the defendants knew and the trial court was charged with notice 
that plaintiffs' claims were appropriately set forth and the law applicable thereto 
was clearly articulated. Discussions with defendants' counsel to withdraw their 
improvident Order On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, dated 
October 4, 1996 so that this case could be resolved in one trial were unfruitful. 
Opposing counsel eventually conceded that plaintiffs' facts and legal arguments 
were sufficient to sustain plaintiffs' claims on appeal. 
" . . . 90 percent of what Mr. Martineau talked about [in argument to 
Judge Iwasaki] had to do with things that Judge Brian has already 
ruled upon. Judge Brian had every fact and plaintiffs had every fact 
that was talked about right here before him at the time. 
When plaintiffs' didn't like the form of the order they 
objected. It was again argued and the Court signed the order as 
stated with the findings. 
This thing - frankly it's going to come back because - well, I don't 
know if it will come back. It will be appealed. Prior to the judge 
that Brian was told it was going to be appealed. I have a real hard 
time with this matter getting tried twice now, going up on appeal and 
perhaps coming back again to be tried a second time." 
(See Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings, dated April 16, 1998 
paged 28 & 29.) 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN 
A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER THE SALES PRACTICES ACT 
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The record at 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203, 208, 215 -
231, 233, 237, 244, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388, 390 - 397, 
417 - 419, reflects the lack merit in defendants' comment that plaintiffs' failed to 
specify violations of the Sales Practices Act. The Sales Practices Act is not 
complex, long or involved. The Sales Practices Act has only two sections, §§ 13-
11-4 and 13-11-5, that could possible apply to this case. 
Count I, Intent To Defraud, and Count II, Tortuous Misrepresentations, of 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 102, 103) go directly to the requirements of § 
13-11-4. A prima facie violation of the Sales Practices Act is established by one's 
showing that a supplier's acts were knowing, intentional or committed with intent 
to deceive. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged a prima facie case that raised 
the inference of deceptive acts and practices as required by law. This inference 
exists only because the statute presumes that a supplier's acts, if unexplained, were 
more likely than not based on impermissible factors as enumerated in § 13-11-
4<2)<a-o). 
Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a prima facie case when they 
presented a preponderance of the evidence that supported their claims. Hqynes, 
917 F.2d at 452. This should have resulted in a factual determination for the jury 
to consider in deciding whether the defendants' reasons were legitimate or 
pretextuaL The Sales Practices Act does not impose rigid, mechanical or 
ritualistic elements in creating a prima facie case. Neither should public policy 
impose onerous requirements in order to establish a prima facie case. 
Plaintiffs suggest that a sensible orderly way to evaluate and apply the 
Sales Practices Act is to consider the evidence in light of common experience as it 
bears on the critical questions set forth in the statutes and decisional law 
construing it. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 924 (Utah 1997) The specific elements 
that must be then proven depend on the nature of the challenged act or practice 
committed by the supplier. 
Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts and Practices, Count III of plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint meets the requirements of § 13-11-5. Whether or not an act 
or practice is unconscionable is for the court to determine after the parties have 
been given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to aid the court in making 
its determination. Plaintiffs' argued unsuccessfully to the trial court that the 
defendants' multiple civil and criminal violations of the laws respecting commerce 
in motor vehicles were per se unconscionable and deceptive act and practices. 
Defendants' conduct also constituted negligence per se. (R. 281, 381 -388.) 
Plaintiffs' twice briefed and argued to the trial court the facts and law 
concerning defendants' misrepresentation concerning the standard, grade, and 
quality of the subject vehicle. The facts are uncontested that the subject vehicle 
sustained major damage to its structural integrity. That the defendants' did not 
fully, professionally, or properly repair the subject vehicle's crush zones, collapse 
zones or energy absorbing structural component parts. They left the floor pan 
crumpled, the seat belt brackets cut and screwed to the floor instead of mounted in 
the mounting brackets. 
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More importantly, the plaintiffs' were given Clark's personal guarantee that 
he had performed the repairs on the subject vehicle. Plaintiffs' believed they were 
dealing with Clark as a neighborhood layperson and could only conclude that the 
damages the vehicle had sustained must not have been that bad or Clark could not 
have performed the repairs. The defendants' intent for criminally acquiring, 
advertising, displaying, showing and selling the subject vehicle is a factual 
determination for the jury to have made and not the trial court. (R. 274, 276 -82) 
The defendants' intent was clearly for the jury to decide. The facts and 
evidence that the jury would have considered in determining the defendants' intent 
were the following, (a) Defendants' knowledge of the nature and extent of the 
damage that resulted in the subject vehicle being declared a total loss salvage. (R. 
396, 397) (b) Defendants' controls over the repairs they caused to be performed 
on the subject vehicle. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401) (c) Defendants' controls over the 
money they spent in repairing the subject vehicle's structural integrity, which in 
this case amounted to a little over $900.00 in repairs to the unibody and other 
major structural component parts. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401) (d) Defendants' 
controls in choosing and directing those whom they contracted to perform the 
repairs in question. (R. 390, 395, 400, 401) (e) Defendants' illegal purchase (i.e., 
not paying sales tax on Clark's purchase), advertisement, display, and sell of the 
subject vehicle. (R. 394, 395) (f) Defendants' concealment that Clark did not 
perform the repairs as represented.(R. 393, 395) (g) Defendants' concealment of 
the inadequate, incomplete, unprofessional and unsafe repairs. (R. 244, 392, 395, 
396) (h) Expert testimony that adequate and safe repairs required much more than 
the defendants spent on the subject vehicle, in addition to other evidence disclosed 
in the course of discovery (R. 244, 248, 249, 334, 339). 
Defendants' attempt to support the trial court rulings by referring to the "as 
is" and "no warranty" disclaimer language. In considering defendants' defense, it 
is significant that plaintiffs answered an advertisement placed by Clark. Plaintiffs' 
then went to Clark's home to look at, test drive and more fully consider whether 
the subject vehicle met their needs. (R. 276 - 282.) It was not until after the 
agreement to purchase had been reached and the paperwork needed to complete 
the deal that plaintiffs first learned that Conover was in fact the owner of the 
subject vehicle. Assuming without conceding that these facts validate defendants' 
disclaimer language, the disclaimer would only run in favor of K & K Sales, not 
Clark or Conover in any event. Defendants' reliance upon the Federal Trade 
Commission regulations is likewise misplaced. 
16 CFR § 455.2(a) has nothing to do with the rebuilding, marketing or sale 
of salvage motor vehicles. Neither does it address incomplete, unprofessional, 
unsafe or damages that are concealed and not repaired. Nor does it preempt 
Utah's health and safety standards such as § 41-3-210 (1)(1 - n), or Utah's motor 
vehicle regulation (i.e., §§ 41-3-205, 41-3-210(l)(a - d), 41-3-701 and 41-3-7021, 
4, & 5) in addition to others). Finally, federal law does not override the Sales 
Practices Act 13-11-1 etc., or the duties, breaches of duties, and damages provided 
under the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs herein. 
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Defendants' next assert that they had no knowledge of defects in their 
repairs prior to selling of the same to plaintiffs. (See Appellees Brief at page 19). 
Plaintiffs' believe that the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles impose 
affirmative duties upon automobile dealers to discover defects. Haynes, 917 F.2d 
at 453 (quoting Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., All F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (D. Conn. 
1977). Defendants' knowledge or intent to deceive may be found where there was 
a reason to know yet they failed to take reasonable steps to determine whether 
their repaired were adequate. (R. 281, 381 -387.) Haynes, 917 F.2d at 453 
(quoting Tusa v. Omaha Auto. Auction Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1253 -54 (8th Cir. 
1983) andNieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 642 (5th Cir. 1978)). (R. 381 - 388.) 
Defendants next state that there were no allegations or legal support that the 
defendants had some unidentified duty to discover defects. {See Appellees Brief 
at page 19.) The argument ignores allegations in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
Under Utah law, to state a claim for misrepresentation, plaintiffs must allege: 
"(1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a 
superior position to know material fact, and (3) carelessly or 
negligently makes false representations concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other 
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that transaction " 
Iadonza v. Mather, 820 F. Supp. 1371, 1384 (D. Utah 1993) (quoting Debry v. 
Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct.App. 1992); Jardine v. Brunswick 
Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967)). Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint taken at face value alleges each of these elements in the Common 
Factual Allegations section thereof (R 98 - 192). Count IV, Breach of Express 
and Implied Warranties, (R. 105, 106) and Count V, Breach of Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing, (R. 106 - 108) restate plaintiffs' claims of that the 
defendants misrepresented the subject vehicles condition and repairs. (R 274). 
On a motion to dismiss a court cannot weigh the evidence as the trial court 
did and determine that the statutes were not violated or that there was no evidence 
that support their violation. These were questions for the trier of fact based upon 
plaintiffs' actual reliance, the reasonableness of their reliance, the character of the 
representations, and the circumstances of the alleged misrepresentations. Iadanza, 
820 F. Supp. at 1384 (citing Condas v. Adams, 15 Utah 2d 132, 388 P.2d 803, 805 
(1964); accord St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Ctr v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 
Arz. 307, 742 P.2d 808, 815 (1987); Stauth v. Brown, 241 Kan. 1, 734 P.2d 1063, 
1068-69 (1987); Epperson v. Rolojf, 102 Nev 206, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (1986), 
(Second) of Torts § 552 comment e (1977). 
Defendants' disclaimer argument does violence to the conceptual 
foundation of a parties' duty to act in good faith in performing contractual 
obligations. One's duty of good faith does not arise from the contract itself, rather 
it is from the "overriding public policy in promoting the creation of and reliance 
on contracts and the public's interest in promoting fairness and reasonableness in 
commercial transactions." Iadanza, 820 F. Supp. at 1388. One's duty of good 
faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectation of the other party." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
205 comment a (1981). 
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The implied covenant does not arise from the express terms of the contract 
as asserted by the defendants (Appellees Brief at page 25 - 27), "but from the 
'grounds of justice that are independent of expressed intentions."' Iadanza, 820 F. 
Supp. at 1388 (citing 3A Corbin on Contracts § 632, at 22 - 23 (1960). Breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to claims for breach of contract. 
Id, Beck v. Farmers' Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). One 
complies with his duty to perform a contract in good faith, when his actions are 
consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
other party. Id. (Citing St. Benedict's Dev. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
200 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants' assertions that plaintiffs failed to introduce any factual 
evidence to support their claims that the defendants' violated the Motor Vehicle 
Act are simply false (Appellees Brief at page 20 - 22.) The record clearly sets 
forth the facts plaintiff's alleged, introduced and argued. (R. 96 - 109, 185, 196, 
200 - 203, 205 - 231, 233, 244 -45, 248 - 49, 253 - 253, 256 - 260, 274, 276 -
282, 373 - 380 and the exhibits attached thereto.) Defendants' reading of § 41-3-
404 as the codification of the common law tort of fraud overreaches. § 41-3-404 
simply allows recovery for losses or damages suffered by reason of fraud, 
fraudulent representation or violations of the laws respecting commence in motor 
vehicles. 
Common law fraud need not be proven in order to recover under § 41-3-
404. One need only show that in transacting any business with a licensed and 
bonded motor vehicle dealer he or she suffered a loss. A review of the annotated 
cases following § 41-3-404 reveals the inaccuracy and lack of merit in defendants' 
assertions that common law fraud must be proven. The defendants' claims that 
without fraud the multiple civil and criminal violations of Motor Vehicle Act 
create no independent cause of action brings this Court back to plaintiffs' initial 
suggestion that it is necessary for this Court to decide whether or not the statutes 
create a dependent or independent cause of action. This issue appears to be one of 
first impression in this jurisdiction. 
The foremost rule in statutory construction is that the court "give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve." Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) see also Savage 
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); American 
Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P. 2d 1, 3, (Utah 1984); Marc Dev. Inc. v. FDIC, 111 
F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (D. Utah 1991). Courts must "look at the plain meaning of 
the language at issue to discern the legislative intent." Chris & Dick's Lumber v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990). 
The plain meaning of the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the 
Commercial Code, defendants' Bond Of Motor Vehicle Dealer, Salesperson, Or 
Crusher (R. 233) and other laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles does not 
support defendants' arguments. Neither are the purposes or intent of the 
legislature achieved through defendants' narrow construction. Nor are defendants' 
assertions that plaintiffs' failed to refer to applicable statutes well taken. The 
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record at 96 - 111, 167 - 78,184 - 87, 196, 200 - 03, 215- 31, 233, 237, 244 -45, 
248 - 49, 252 - 53, 256 - 70, 274, 276 - 282, 373 - 388 and the exhibits referred 
to therein as well as the Reporter's Transcript Of Videotaped Proceedings, dated 
April 16,1998 at pages 20 - 29 unequivocally contradict such assertions. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR BREACHES OF 
CONTRACT, EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES 
The record is packed with references to the inaccuracy of defendants' 
claims that plaintiffs omitted from the trial court the issues that are now before this 
Court. (R. 95 - 102, 172 - 180, 184 - 188, 196, 200 - 203, 208, 215 - 231, 233, 
237, 244, 248, 252, 253, 256 - 259, 276 - 282, 373 - 388, 390 - 397, 417 - 419). 
All the Counts' in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint directly or indirectly dealt with 
defendants' breaches of contract. Count IV specifically alleged "Breach of 
Express and Implied Warranties." 
As with the Sales Practices Act and Motor Vehicle Act, it is the court's 
duty to give effect to the statutory provisions requiring that the statutes be liberally 
construed in order to achieve the statutes' objectives. Brickyard Homeowners' 
Ass'n Man. Comm v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983). § 13-
11-2 directs that the "act be construed liberally to promote" its policies. The cases 
that construe § 41-3-404 require that this section be "construed broadly to protect 
persons doing business with motor vehicle dealers. Western Sur. Co. v. Redding, 
626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981); Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 
(1956). 
The Commercial Code has a similar provision as found in §§ 70A-1-102(1), 
70A-1-103 and 70A-1-106. The issue of defendants' breach of contract was twice 
briefed and argued to the trial court. Judge Brian's Minute Entry properly found 
in part: 
"Court hears argument from respective counsel Re: Motions (sic) for 
summary judgment. Summary Judgment is denied. The Court finds 
there is only one factual issue for trial and that is what seller 
represented to buyer Re: The condition of the vehicle and repairs 
that were made to the vehicle. The issue of punitive damages and of 
fraud are dismissed . . . . " 
(R. 274). Notwithstanding the limitations contained in Judge Brian's Minute 
Entry the form of the Order presented for entry far exceeded the language, scope 
and content of the trial court's actual ruling. For this reason plaintiffs' objected to 
the form of the order (R. 275 - 283). All of plaintiffs' claims that related to 
defendants' breach of contract remained intact following Judge Brian's ruling (i.e., 
Intent To Defraud, Tortuous Misrepresentation, Deceptive and Unconscionable 
Acts and Practices, Breach of Express and Implied Warranty, and Breach of 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.) 
Plaintiffs' have no dispute with defendants' "as is," "no warranty" 
disclaimers to the extent such disclaimers are limited to the facts defendants made 
known and disclosed to them. Serious legal, moral and ethical problems are 
presented however with defendants' attempts to disclaim liability for conditions, 
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issues and defects they concealed, hid or intentionally failed to disclose. This is 
even more true when one considers the serious safety issues that arise when an 
unsuspecting and uninformed consumer buys a vehicle that was improperly, 
unprofessionally, incompletely and dangerously repaired. 
§§ 41-3-210(1X1, m, & n) 78-15-6, and 13-11-4(a, b, c, & e), 70A-2-303, 
70A-2-313 (a & b), 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 uniformly and consistently identify 
and describe the acts, errors and omissions that warrant imposition of liability on 
those who breach the duties assumed or imposed on those with superior 
knowledge. Defendants' request that this Court relieve them of such liability. 
POINT V 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' BREACHES OF CONTRACT, 
AND WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS WERE ACCURATELY AND 
FULLY BRIEFED AND ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
The District Courts were presented with the facts, the law and the 
arguments that accurately, fully, and properly present the legal consequence of 
defendants' breach of contract as measured against defendants' warranty 
disclaimers. (R. 215 - 231, 233, 237, 244 - 45, 248 - 49, 252 - 53, 255 - 73, 274, 
276 - 82, 344 - 71, 372 - 407, 417 - 19). 
The new issues and arguments raised by defendants' in their appellees 
brief, pages 24-31 , concerning their breaches of contract and breaches of express 
and implied warranties were already fully briefed to the trial court. In the interests 
of avoiding duplicity, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court refer to the 
following parts of the record: 
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment, dated July 8,1996 (R. 214 - 254). 
2. Minute Entry, dated August 2,1996 (R. 274), and 
3. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Second 
Motion For Summary Judgment, dated March 16,1998 (R. 372 - 407.) 
There are certain procedural and due process rights and principles that are 
meant to govern and control litigation and trial court decisions while being 
litigated. One such principle is that trial courts of comparable authority lack the 
authority to sit as appellate courts on one another decisions. Another such 
principle is the Doctrine Of Law Of The Case. Plaintiffs' believe that the trial 
court's handling of their claims violated these established procedural rights. 
Plaintiffs' likewise believe that the trial court usurped the authority of the jury in 
deciding the factual issues identified and presented in this appeal. Finally 
plaintiffs' believe that the trial court simply ignored the law or misapplied the law 
to the undisputed material facts of their case. 
The Honorable Pat Brian properly denied defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and determined that factual issues warranted a trial to determine what 
the sellers represented to the buyers concerning the condition of the subject 
vehicle and its repairs. The facts and the law did not change. Accordingly the 
Honorable Glen Iwasaki improperly overruled Judge Brian in making findings of 
fact in connection with the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should clearly state that plaintiffs' claims and causes of action 
constitute independent basis for imposing liability. An opinion is sorely needed 
that clearly sets forth the public policy of this State concerning the application and 
construction of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles and their inter-
relationship. Such a decision would assist in establishing the minimum standards 
motor vehicle dealers must adhere to and would result in greatly reducing the 
deceptive and unfair sales practices that the defendants engaged in herein. 
This Court should rule: (A) That the defendants had positive non-
abandonable legal duties to know the physical condition of the subject vehicle at 
the time it was sold by them to the plaintiff's and to honestly, fully, fairly and 
timely advise plaintiffs of all relevant facts concerning such condition. (B) That 
the plaintiffs are entitled to pursue each and all of the rights and remedies which 
are expressly afforded them by the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the 
Commercial Code, the Utah Administrative Code, the Dealer's Bond and the Sales 
Contract. (C) That the Trial Court's award of costs was in error. And (D) that the 
aforementioned Acts are to be construed liberally and broadly in favor of 
consumers, such as the plaintiffs, to insure that the rights and remedies of the 
consuming public are safe guarded and rendered effective and meaningful. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '$ clay of March, 1999. 
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